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Objective. To examine the extent to which health plan quality measures capture
physician practice patterns rather than plan characteristics.
Data Source. We gathered and merged secondary data from the following four
sources: a private firm that collected information on individual physicians and their
health plan affiliations, The National Committee for Quality Assurance, InterStudy, and
the Dartmouth Atlas.
Study Design. We constructed two measures of physician network overlap for all
health plans in our sample and linked them to selected measures of plan performance.
Two linear regression models were estimated to assess the relationship between the
measures of physician network overlap and the plan performance measures.
Principal Findings. The results indicate that in the presence of a higher degree of
provider network overlap, plan performance measures tend to converge to a lower level
of quality.
Conclusions. Standard health plan performance measures reflect physician practice
patterns rather than plans’ effort to improve quality. This implies that more provider-
oriented measurement, such as would be possible with accountable care organizations
or medical homes, may facilitate patient decision making and provide further incentives
to improve performance.
Key Words. Physician network overlap, managed care, health plan, quality, ac-
countable care organizations (ACO), HEDIS, CAHPS
One approach to reforming the health care system involves creating more
competitive health care markets. Some proposals focus on competition among
health plans, under the implicit assumption that well-informed purchasers and
consumers can choose their plan based on costs, benefit structure, and quality
(Robinson 1999; Scanlon et al. 2005). As a result, health plan performance




measurement is common (Bundorf, Choudhry, and Baker 2006), reflecting the
assumption that plans are responsible, at least in part, for the quality of care
received by their members.
Yet plan control over quality is limited. Typical measures of health plan
performance include process measures that likely reflect physician practice
style and behavior. To the extent that hospitals and physicians contract with
multiple health plans, plans may be less able to distinguish themselves in the
marketplace on these measures (Chernew et al. 2004). As such, if the degree of
physician overlap is large, comparing health plans based on performance
measures may not necessarily convey the information that either consumers
or policy makers seek about variation in the quality of care, limiting the use-
fulness of the measures for practical purposes.
Thus, the health plan may not be the most useful unit for measuring
quality of care experienced by consumers. Instead, provider-oriented struc-
tures, such as accountable care organizations (ACOs) or medical homes,
where the primary responsibility of delivering high-quality care is assumed to
rest with the providers, may constitute a step in the right direction toward the
goal of creating more meaningful quality metrics (Fisher et al. 2007). Of
course, measurement at this more refined level can always be aggregated to
the health plan level if plan-level comparisons are desired.
In this paper, we empirically explore the extent to which the overlap in
health plans’ physician networks is correlated with health plan performance
using a unique dataset. Our results indicate that in the presence of a higher
degree of provider network overlap, plan performance measures tend to con-
verge to a lower level of quality.
In previous research, Chernew et al. (2004) demonstrated that there is
about a fifty–fifty chance that a patient switching a plan may not need to
change his or her physician. Baker et al. (2004) showed that variation in the
Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) scores may be
explained by the systematic but unobserved heterogeneity of both providers
and plans, suggesting that providers may indeed affect HEDIS scores.
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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Health plans’ provider networks form for two reasons. First, by joining the list
of ‘‘preferred’’ or ‘‘exclusive’’ providers affiliated with a health plan, a provider
can gain access to a steady flow of patients and revenue; second, health plans
benefit by obtaining discounts as well as some control over how the providers
utilize resources to treat their enrollees (Ma and McGuire 2002). As the num-
ber of plans increases in a market while the number of providers remains
unchanged, competition is likely to lead to increased overlap in the plans’
provider networks.
The existing measures of plan performances, however, commonly in-
clude process measures——for example, rates of prescription of beta blockers
following a heart attack, retinopathy exam rates for diabetics, preventive
screening test utilization rates such as mammography or preventive immu-
nizations, etc.——that are likely to reflect physician practice styles and behaviors
as well as the characteristics of the plan, patients, and the market in which they
operate. As such, we begin with the assumption that a health plan’s scores on
performance measures are jointly determined by its contracted physicians, its
enrolled members and patients, as well as the plan’s own characteristics, such
as profit status, enrollment size, and time in business.
Plan performance is also assumed to be affected by market conditions and
regional practice norms. In particular, regional variation in medical utilization,
practice patterns, and costs has been well-documented in recent literature
(Fisher et al. 2003). Given that health plans typically operate in multiple markets
across several geographical regions, it is likely that their overall plan-level per-
formance measures also reflect the variation in practice patterns and resource
utilization rates across all of the markets in which they operate.
Existing literature indicates that managed care plans are in a unique
position to implement quality improvement initiatives and have strong
incentive to do so (Scanlon et al. 2000). Plans can influence physicians by the
incentives they provide (e.g., payment), educational programs they offer,
or information they provide about patients (e.g., chronic care registries). Plans
may also directly influence patients through benefit design, prevention
programs offered (e.g., smoking cessation programs), or disease or care
management programs.
However, many of the available measures of plan performance such as
HEDIS are more likely to be functions of physician practice styles and patterns
that do not vary patient by patient (Glied and Zivin 2002). If the plan quality
measures are ultimately driven by the physicians and, in essence, reflect their
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practice patterns, one would expect that plan performance measures are fun-
damentally explained by the number of physicians the plans have in common
with other plans——that is, physician network overlap. Therefore, we expect that
as physician network overlap increases, plan performance scores will converge.
We also expect higher overlap to be associated with plan performance
converging to a lower level. We hypothesize that a greater degree of physician
network overlap may lead to less incentive for individual plans to undertake
quality improvement initiatives at the physician level because the benefits
from such efforts would spill over to the plans’ competitors, with whom the
physicians may also contract (N. D. Beaulieu unpublished data; Beaulieu et al.
2006). Thus, as plans share more of their physician networks with their com-
petitors, we expect individual plan performance measures to decline on average.
DATA
We gathered and merged relevant data from the following four sources: a
private firm, The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), In-
terStudy, and the Dartmouth Atlas.
Plan Physician Network
Our data originated from a private firm that collected information on indi-
vidual physicians and their health plan affiliations. This firm collected the data
to generate a comprehensive database of plan–physician combinations for
employers who wanted an easy way for their employees to search for affiliated
physicians or to check if their physician was in any given plan. The firm gave
us access to its proprietary electronic provider lists for 214 health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) that reflect each plan’s physician network for January
2001, 2002, and 2003.
We compared our physician sample against the area resource file (ARF)
data and found that the physicians in our sample were fairly representative of
all physicians in the United States during the same period in terms of geo-
graphical location. Our sample contained physicians from all 50 states plus the
District of Columbia, with more than half concentrated in six states: Califor-
nia, New York, Ohio, Texas, Florida, and New Jersey. Moreover, over 95
percent of the physicians in the sample were located primarily in metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs). According to the ARF data in the same period, the top
five states in terms of number of physicians were California, New York, Texas,
Florida, and Pennsylvania (in our data, Pennsylvania was seventh);
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furthermore, ARF indicated that about 98 percent of all physicians in the
United States were located in MSAs.
Because the firm provided specific physician names to interested em-
ployees and benefits managers, we believe the data to be highly accurate. Nev-
ertheless, to assess the accuracy and reliability of the dataset, we checked the
affiliations of all listed physicians in two large plans. We provided the physician
lists and asked the plans to verify that all listed physicians were indeed affiliated
with the plans. We found a combined error rate ofo1.5 percent, suggesting that
although the dataset had some noise, it was relatively accurate.
Because hospital-based physicians (radiologists, anesthesiologists, pa-
thologists, and hospitalists) often do not appear on health plan provider lists,
our measure of overlap is therefore best interpreted as a measure of overlap
among community-based physicians.
Measuring Network Overlap
We construct two measures of overlap. One is a ‘‘plan pair’’ measure that
captures the overlap between any pair of plans. This allows us to test how
overlap affects the convergence in quality performance. The other is the av-
erage number of health plans with which the physicians in a given plan have
contracts. This allows us to investigate the effect of a plan’s overlap with other
plans on its own quality performance. In constructing these measures, we
assume that those physicians contracting with the same plan also belong to the
same ‘‘networks.’’ Thus, to some extent, we use the terms ‘‘physician network’’
and ‘‘plan affiliation’’ interchangeably. In reality, however, belonging to a
same plan may not be equivalent to belonging to a same physician network——
that is, independent physician association (IPA) or preferred provider
organization (PPO); unfortunately, we are not able to observe the actual
‘‘network’’ to which each physician belongs.
A ‘‘plan pair’’ measure is defined for every unique combination of two
plans. It is calculated as the number of physicians belonging to both plans
divided by the total number of physicians belonging to either plan. For ex-
ample, suppose plan A has 300 physicians and plan B has 500 physicians in
their respective networks. Also suppose that there are 200 physicians who are
in both networks (thus counted twice). Then, the plan–pair overlap is 33.3
percent——that is, 200 divided by (3001500 200). This is possible because
our data allow us to explicitly observe physicians’ plan affiliations.
The average number of plans contracted by physicians belonging to a
given plan’s network captures the degree to which a plan shares its physician
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panel with all other competitors in the market. For example, suppose a plan
contracts with five physicians, each of whom also contracts with two other
plans in the market (thus, each physician contracts with three plans in total).
Then the average number of plans contracted by the plan’s network physi-
cians is three (313131313 5 15 divided by 5). A greater value on this mea-
sure might suggest less incentive for the plan to undertake quality
improvement initiatives at the physician level because any benefits from such
initiatives would spill over to the plan’s competitors.
Note that the plan–pair overlap value of 0 percent corresponds to a plan-
level overlap value of one plan per physician; that is, if every physician in a
given plan contracts with only one plan, that implies that none of those phy-
sicians appears in any other plan’s network (i.e., exclusive provider network).
Given our method of constructing the overlap measure, however, a ‘‘zero
overlap’’ can reflect one of two situations. First, it may reflect two plans in the
same market using exclusive physician networks. This is most likely when
either or both of the plans in a given plan pair are predominantly group or staff
model HMOs.
Alternatively, it could reflect two plans operating in entirely different
markets, resulting in zero overlap by definition. To assess whether our results
are sensitive to this alternative definition of zero overlap, we obtained a sep-
arate set of results using a ‘‘full’’ sample that included all the plan pairs that do
not operate in the same market, assigning an overlap value of zero for such
plan pairs. Because we found no significant difference in our results from this
broader definition of zero overlap, we focused only on the plan pairs that do
operate in the same markets.
Plan Performance and Characteristics
We linked HEDIS and Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems (CAHPS) data obtained from the NCQA to the HMOs contained in
the private firm’s dataset for the corresponding years (i.e., 2001, 2002, and
2003). Ideally, we would have liked to observe plan performance measures at
the geographical market level in order to explicitly account for the market-
level factors that influence them. However, because HEDIS and CAHPS are
measured at the plan level rather than at the market level (i.e., they reflect each
plan’s performances aggregated across all markets in which it operates), we
were unable to achieve this level of detail in our dataset.
To account for the plan characteristics, we also merged in data from
InterStudy’s MSA Profiler and Competitive Edge. Because InterStudy and NCQA
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do not use common health plan identifiers, we matched the plans manually,
relying on plan name and geographic service area. This resulted in a dataset of
189 health plans, representing about 66 percent of total commercial HMO
enrollment in the United States as of 2001.
Our sample was more likely to include larger and older plans operating
in large urban markets. Using the 2002 and 2003 data, we then constructed a
dataset of those plans covering the 3-year period. We were unable to link
approximately 20 percent of the plans in our network overlap data to the
NCQA data, presumably because either these plans did not report data to
NCQA or we could not find the appropriate match. Also, some plans that had
appeared initially in the 2001 data dropped out of the data in later years,
presumably due to mergers or acquisitions.
Selecting Plan Performance Measures
As dependent variables, we chose a subset of eight HEDIS and four CAHPS
measures for analysis. Specifically, we focused on HEDIS measures related to
breast cancer screening, adolescent immunization, and diabetes care. The
selection of these measures was driven by our a priori expectation that they are
more likely to be influenced by individual physician characteristics and prac-
tice styles than other available measures.
To check whether our method may pick up false associations between
physician network overlap and plan performance measures, we also included
the CAHPS ‘‘Claims Processing’’ measure as an outcome variable under the
assumption that patients’ assessment of plans’ claims processing would de-
pend on plans’ behaviors and not on physician behaviors. We therefore ex-
pect a nonsignificant relationship between the ‘‘Claims Processing’’ measure
and the physician overlap measure.
HEDIS Data Collection Methods
Plans could use either administrative or hybrid methods to collect the necessary
data to compute their HEDIS scores. The administrative method relied on ex-
amining claims data to determine the relevant performance measures, while the
hybrid method involved supplementing the claims data with chart audits of ran-
domly selected samples of eligible enrollees. Thus, different collection methods
might have led to differences in the plan performance measures (Pawlson,
Scholle, and Powers 2007). Therefore, we created categorical variables to control
for the differences in HEDIS collection methods in our regression analyses.
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Regional Variation and Plan Enrollee Case Mix
Plan performance scores are further affected by enrollee characteristics and
other unobserved market characteristics that lead to plan quality variation not
attributable to plans’ quality improvement activities or to physician practice
patterns. To account for this, we created the following four indices: case mix,
ambulatory-care sensitive conditions (ACSC), market share, and market dis-
similarity index (MDI).
To capture the plan differences in terms of unobserved enrollee health
status and severity of illnesses, we calculated the average enrollee prevalence
rate of four chronic conditions (heart disease, diabetes, asthma, and hyper-
tension) for each plan from the NCQA data. More specifically, for each of the
chronic conditions, we obtained the percentage of each plan’s total enrollee
population identified as having that condition and calculated the average of
the percentages to obtain our case mix index. A higher value of this index for a
given plan thus indicated a sicker enrollee population for that plan.
To create an index that captures the regional variation in resource uti-
lization that may affect plan performance measures, we merged in the Dart-
mouth Atlas data because the Atlas data contain rich information on the
variation in Medicare utilization and practice patterns across regions. Al-
though our plan performance measures are relevant only for commercial
HMOs, there has been strong evidence (Needleman et al. 2003; Wennberg
et al. 2004; Baker, Fisher, and Wennberg 2008) that observed treatment pat-
terns and quality of care among the Medicare population are likely to be
highly correlated with those among the general population. We based our
index on hospital discharge rates for ACSC. Previous research suggests that
ACSC discharge rates exhibit significant geographical variations (McCall,
Harlow, and Dayhoff 2001), reflecting regional differences in terms of utili-
zation, access to health care, market conditions, and practice norms.
To obtain the ACSC index, we used the following formula:
Regional variation index of plan j operating in M markets ðACSCÞ ¼
XM
m¼1
ðshare of plan j 0s total enrollment derived from market mÞ
 ðACSC per 1; 000 in market mÞ
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Market Characteristics
The degree to which the markets for physician practices and plans are con-
centrated in each locale may influence the degree of physician network over-
lap, potentially based on the provider practice patterns and quality. Moreover,
existence of a ‘‘dominant’’ plan in terms of the local market share may induce
adoption of certain practice styles and patterns across all providers in the
market.
Thus, to control for the effects of health plan market concentration on
plan performance measures, we obtained a variable that captures, on average,
how ‘‘dominant’’ plans are across the markets they serve using the following
formula:
Weighted average market share of plan j operating in M markets ¼
XM
m¼1
ðshare of plan j 0s total enrollment derived from market mÞ
 ðplan j 0s market share in mÞ
From our data, it was not possible to directly identify all the relevant market
characteristics that may impact the physician network overlap and plan per-
formance, such as the competitiveness of the physician market. Instead, for
any given plan pair, we constructed an MDI that is presumed to capture the
differences in the unobserved market conditions that the plans face. MDI was
calculated as
MDI between plans i and j serving M common markets ¼
XM
m¼1
jShare of plan i 0s total enrollment derived from market m
"
 Share of plan j 0s total enrollment derived from market mj

M
If plans i and j served the same markets and derived the exact same amount of
‘‘business’’ from each of those markets, MDI would be zero, indicating that the
plans were subjected to identical market conditions. On the other hand, if the
plans operated in different markets, MDI would approach one.
These indices were used as control variables in our regression models
described in the next section. Refer to Table 1 for the complete list of the
variables used for the analyses and their descriptions.
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Table 1: Variable Description
Dependent variables
BCS Percentage of continuously enrolled women between age 52 and 69
who had a mammogram during the measurement year
AMMR Percentage of continuously enrolled adolescents who turned 13 years
old during the measurement year and had a second dose of MMR
immunization by 13th birthday
AHB Percentage of continuously enrolled adolescents who turned 13 years
old during the measurement year and had three hepatitis B
immunizations or complete two-dose regimen by 13th birthday
A1c Test Percentage of continuously enrolled members with diabetes (Type 1
and Type 2) age 18–75 receiving hemoglobin A1c (HbA1C)
testing during the measurement year
A1c Control Percentage of continuously enrolled members with diabetes (Type 1
and Type 2) age 18–75 whose HbA1c was poorly controlled
(49.5%) during the measurement year (subtracted from 100% to
make higher rates indicate better performance)
Eye Exam Percentage of continuously enrolled members with diabetes (Type 1
and Type 2) age 18–75 receiving an eye exam during the
measurement year
Lipid Control Percentage of continuously enrolled members with diabetes (Type 1
and Type 2) age 18–75 whose most recent LDL-C level was less
than 130 mg/dL during the measurement year
Nephropathy Percentage of continuously enrolled members with diabetes (Type 1
and Type 2) age 18–75 who were monitored for nephropathy
during the measurement year
Claims Processing Member satisfaction rating on claims processing during the 12-
month continuous enrollment period (0–100 scale)
Getting Care Quickly Member satisfaction rating on how quickly patients were able to
obtain care during the 12-month continuous enrollment period
(0–100 scale)
Doctor Communication Member satisfaction rating on how well doctors communicated with
patients during the 12-month continuous enrollment period (0–100
scale)
Staff Helpful Member satisfaction rating on how their practitioner office staff were
courteous and helpful during the 12-month continuous enrollment
period (0–100 scale)
Explanatory variables
Plan–Pair Overlap Percentage of physicians who appear in both plans’ networks
Plans per Physician Average number of health plans that the physicians in a given plan
have a contract with
For-Profit 5 1 if the plan has for-profit status; 0 if nonprofit
Both Plans NP 5 1 if both plans have nonprofit status; 0 otherwise
One NP One FP 5 1 if one plan has for-profit status and the other has nonprofit status;
0 otherwise
Both Plans FP 5 1 if both plans have for-profit status; 0 otherwise (omitted
category)
continued
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METHODOLOGY
To test the first hypothesis that a higher degree of physician network overlap is
associated with convergence of plan performance measures between two
plans, the following linear regression model was estimated:
DiffðPerformijtqÞ ¼a0 þ a1ðPlanPair OverlapijtÞ þ a2DiffðPlanijtÞ
þ a3DiffðPatientijtÞ þ a4DiffðMarketijt Þ þ a5ðYearÞ þ eijtq
ð1Þ
where Diff(Performijtq) denotes the absolute difference of plan performance
scores between plans i and j in year t for a given performance measure q;
(Plan–Pair Overlapijt) is the measure of physician network overlap between
plans i and j at time t; Diff(Planijt) represents the vector of absolute differences
in plan characteristics; Diff(Patientijt) captures the absolute difference of the
Table 1. Continued
Plan Age 410 years 5 1 if the plan is older than 10 years; 0 otherwise
Both o10 years 5 1 if both plans are younger than 10 years; 0 otherwise
One o10 years One
410 years
5 1 if one plan is older than 10 years and the other is younger than 10
years; 0 otherwise
Both 410 years 5 1 if both plans are older than 10 years (omitted category)
Enrollment Plan’s total national enrollment size in hundred thousands
Staff/Group Percentage of the plan’s total enrollment in staff/group HMO model
Network Percentage of the plan’s total enrollment in network HMO model
IPA Percentage of the plan’s total enrollment in network IPA model
# Model Type Number of different HMO model types employed by the plan
Case Mix Average prevalence rates of heart disease, asthma, diabetes, and
hypertension among plan enrollees
% Medicare & Medicaid Percentage of the plan’s total enrollees enrolled in Medicare &
Medicaid
ACSC Average number of hospital discharges for ambulatory care sensitive
conditions per thousand Medicare enrollees across all markets
served by plan
Market Share Average market share across all markets served by plan
MDI 5 0 if plan pair serves the same markets and approaches 1 as they
serve different markets
Administrative Method 5 1 if plan used administrative data collection method only; 0
otherwise




5 1 if both plans in a plan pair used administrative data collection
method only; 0 otherwise
Method: Different 5 1 if plan pair used different data collection methods; 0 otherwise
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plan enrollee case mix; Diff(Marketijt) indicates the absolute differences of the
market characteristics for both plans; and Year is the indicator variable for
year t.
To test the second hypothesis that a higher degree of physician network
overlap is associated with lower levels of performance at the individual plan
level, the following model was estimated:
Performitq ¼b0 þ b1ðPlans per PhysicianÞit þ b2ðPlanÞit
þ b3ðPatientÞit þ b4ðMarketÞit þ b5ðYearÞ þ uitq
ð2Þ
where (Plans per Physician)it denotes the average number of health plans that
the physicians in plan i have contracted with, including plan i. Performitq
represents plan i’s performance on measure q at time t. Other variables are
defined similarly as in equation (1).
We weighted the plans per physician measure to reflect the fact that
plans typically operate in many markets and thus derive disproportionate
amounts of business from those markets. The weight was the share of the
plan’s total enrollment derived from each of the markets in which the plan
operates. Thus, greater weights were given to markets in which plans derive
greater shares of their total business.
Both equations (1) and (2) were estimated using the ordinary least
squares (OLS) estimator. Technically, a fixed-effects model approach (i.e.,
inclusion of plan or plan–pair indicator variables in the estimation models to
control for any unobserved plan effects) was feasible. Unfortunately, our data
showed little variation in the physician networks over time because physician
panels tend to remain stable, at least over a short period. As such, our fixed-
effects model estimates showed little statistical significance on the overlap
coefficient estimates. Moreover, because HEDIS and CAHPS measures were
available only at the plan level, we were unable to include market fixed-effects
in our empirical models to further capture unobserved market effects. There-
fore, we reported below only the results obtained from the model specifica-
tions without any fixed effects.
Because of the nature of our data (i.e., same physicians belonging to
multiple plans), the standard i.i.d assumption on the error terms was likely to
be incorrect. To account for this in equation (1), we implemented the multiway
clustering developed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2006). As the unit of
analysis in equation (1) was the plan pair, there were three ways to cluster the
observations: cluster by the first plan in each pair, by the second plan in each
pair, and by the plan pair itself, because each plan pair occurred up to three
times in our sample because of the longitudinal nature of our data.
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In equation (2), because of physician network overlap, the error terms
across the individual plans were also likely to be correlated, with the corre-
lation being stronger among the plans that have larger overlap. To assess this,
we attempted two alternative clustering approaches. In the first, we imple-
mented a simple one-way clustering by plan to capture any serial correlation
over time. In the second approach, we further grouped the plans into quartiles
of the average number of plans per physician and re-estimated the models
using a two-way clustering method. Because the standard errors obtained from
the first approach tended to be slightly larger than the second, we reported the
results obtained from the first approach, because they represented the more
conservative estimates of the standard errors.
RESULTS
Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates on the measures of physician network
overlap obtained from equations (1) and (2). As expected, our model indicates
little association between the CAHPS ‘‘Claims Processing’’ measure and net-
work overlap. The negative coefficient estimate on the overlap variable in
Table 2: Estimated Coefficients on Network Overlap Measure (SE in
Parentheses)
Network Overlap (Equation (1)) Plans per Physician (Equation (2))
BCS  4.61 (1.07nnn)  0.54 (0.15nnn)
AMMR  6.64 (2.66nn)  0.95 (0.40nn)
AHB  4.67 (2.57n)  0.40 (0.48)
A1c Test  6.22 (4.00)  0.51 (0.20nn)
A1c Control  8.13 (3.37nn)  0.77 (0.28nnn)
Eye Exam  8.81 (2.75nnn)  1.50 (0.29nnn)
Lipid Control  5.77 (3.03n)  0.30 (0.21)
Diabetic Nephropathy  9.01 (3.48nnn)  1.25 (0.24nnn)
Claims Process  0.14 (0.89)  0.23 (0.20)
Doctor Communication  0.29 (0.42)  0.19 (0.06nnn)
Getting Care Quickly  1.86 (0.65nnn)  0.70 (0.12nnn)
Office Staff Helpful  0.81 (0.35nn)  0.37 (0.06nnn)
Notes. This table shows only the coefficient estimates on the measures of physician network overlap
in the regression models. Coefficients on other covariates (including plan age, ownership status,
enrolment, collection methods, etc.) were also estimated; for the complete regression results, see
the Supporting Information.
nnnSignificant at 1% level.
nnSignificant at 5% level.
nSignificant at 10% level.
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equation (1) is consistent with our first hypothesis and suggests that plan per-
formance converges as physician network overlap broadens, although the
measured magnitude of convergence differs by plan performance measure.
The coefficient on the number of plans per physician variable, obtained
from estimating equation (2), also indicates a pattern, consistent with our
second hypothesis that an individual plan’s performance declines as the phy-
sicians in the plan’s network contract with other health plans.
Simulation
To facilitate interpretation of our regression results, we performed a series of
simulation exercises based on the parameter estimates obtained from the two
regression models, focusing on performance measures for which the coefficients
on the overlap measures were statistically significant in both equations. Our goal
was to simulate a series of policy ‘‘experiments’’ in which two otherwise identical
hypothetical plans were subject to different levels of physician network overlap,
holding all else equal. More specifically, both of the hypothetical plans were
assumed to have been in operation for more than 10 years; were for-profit; and
used the hybrid data collection method as of 2003. All other variables were given
their mean values, as shown in the descriptive statistics table in the Supporting
Information.
Across all seven health plan performance measures in Figure 1, the gaps in
scores between the two plans disappear as the network overlap increases. For
some measures, appreciable differences in the measures may entirely disappear
when plans share common physician panels. Particularly for diabetic nephropa-
thy rates and eye exam rates, going from 0 percent overlap to 100 percent overlap
corresponds to reductions in the differences by about 9 percentage points.
At the same time, the degree of convergence is not as dramatic for other
measures. Moreover, the results generally indicate that the performance mea-
sures do not converge completely even when plans approach entirely overlap-
ping physician networks. This suggests that plans do make some contribution in
determining their own aggregate plan performance results, albeit not as much as
would be suggested when the physician network overlap is not taken into con-
sideration. Note that in our regression models, we are unable to control for
every plan-specific characteristic, such as individual plans’ unique disease man-
agement programs, that give them the ‘‘competitive edge’’ against their com-
petitors. Such unobserved plan characteristics are likely to account for the
persistent residual differences in the plan performance measures.
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Figure 2: Simulated Plan Performance Scores
Figure 1: Simulated Convergence of Plan Performance Scores
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Figure 2 illustrates that the HEDIS and CAHPS measures decline as the
physicians in our hypothetical plan’s network contract with a greater number
of other health plans. When the physicians move from an exclusive contract-
ing relationship (i.e., one plan per physician) to contracting with as many as 10
plans, the nephropathy and eye exam plan performance measures decline by
about 11–13 percentage points. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
plans face a reduced incentive to improve quality when physicians are shared
by multiple plans.
CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that when there is overlap in health plans’ physician pro-
vider networks, plan performance scores converge, generally resulting in
lower values as physicians contract with multiple plans. We hypothesize that
plans have less of an incentive to invest in quality when overlap is high,
because returns to this investment may accrue to competing plans as well.
Additionally, the investment required to improve quality may be larger when
physicians are not exclusively affiliated with a single plan.
There are two practical implications of our study: first, for the end-users
of HEDIS and CAHPS measures, interpreting such commonly available
health plan performance measures as metrics of health plan quality must be
done cautiously. Indeed, our results indicate that, if one’s goal is to accurately
assess the quality of care experienced by a group of consumers, the health care
provider level may be the more meaningful unit of observation. The current
interest in provider-oriented entities such as ACOs or medical homes may
help establish a more credible and useful unit for measuring the quality of care,
while still allowing for the possibility of aggregating to the plan level.
Second, in the presence of increasingly overlapping provider networks,
quality improvement initiatives that depend on physician participation may
be more productive if sponsored at the community, rather than at the indi-
vidual plan level. Interestingly, this is consistent with the increasing trend
toward community-based approaches to quality improvements, such as the
Department of Health and Human Service’s Chartered Value Exchange effort
and private foundation-funded efforts such as the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation’s Aligning Forces for Quality initiative (Hurley et al. 2009).
In either case, our analysis illustrates that significant overlap in provider
networks can influence market outcomes. Proposals for insurance exchanges
and other procompetitive strategies must recognize that overlap in physician
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provider networks will influence the way health plans compete, resulting in
real quality differences for patients.
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